Document added 26 July 2011 by Summer Associate from the Utilities & Energy industry
Unless clean tech follows well-established rules of innovation and commercialization, the industry’s promise to provide sustainable sources of energy will fail.
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Stanford Social Innovation Review
Email: info@ssireview.org, www.ssireview.org
Picking Green Tech’s Winners and Losers
By Clayton M. Christensen, Shuman Talukdar,
Richard Alton & Michael B. Horn
Stanford Social Innovation Review
Spring 2011
Copyright 2011 by Leland Stanford Jr. University
All Rights Reserved
30 STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW • Spring 2011
O
n April 22, 2009, four months after he took o f f ice, Presi-
dent Barack Obama proclaimed that green technolo-
gies would be the linchpin of economic advancement.
“We can hand over the jobs of the 21st century to our
competitors,” he said at a wind energy manufacturing plant in New-
ton, Iowa, “or we can confront what countries in Europe and Asia
have already recognized as both a challenge and an opportunity:
The nation that leads the world in creating new energy sources will
be the nation that leads the 21st-century global economy.”
Private sector investors in the United States have been simi-
larly enthusiastic, investing a total of $8.9 billion in clean energy
companies in 2009.1 This is a sizable sum, but it does not guar-
antee that green technologies will provide a su f f icient return on
investment. Both the public and private sectors spent billions of
dollars developing the market for corn-based ethanol over the past
20 years before a consensus emerged that ethanol would not solve
the economic and environmental problems it targeted.
A similar story may be playing out in the solar cell industry, as
evidenced by Massachusetts’s experience with Evergreen Solar. In
Unless clean tech follows well-established
rules of innovation and commercialization,
the industry’s promise to provide sustain-
able sources of energy will fail.
Picking
Green Tech’s
Winners
and
Losers
By Clayton M. Christensen, Shuman Talukdar, Richard Alton, & Michael B. Horn
Illustration by Harry Campbell
2007, the state invested millions of dollars to entice Evergreen to
build a new plant near Boston. The plant did create 800 manufac-
turing jobs, but the excitement over the deal eventually soured.
As solar cell prices plummeted from late 2008 onward, Evergreen
faced mounting losses and saw its stock price crater from $15 to 80
cents. Then in January 2011, Evergreen announced it would close
its factory and shift production to a joint venture with a Chinese
company in central China—this after $43 million in assistance
from the government of Massachusetts.2
Massachusetts’s experience should serve as a cautionary tale
about investing in green energy. If governments pour large subsi-
dies into green technologies, they run the risk of backing technolo-
gies that, like ethanol, are fundamentally f lawed. Solar power is a
similarly f lawed technology if it is deployed in competition with
the existing power grid.
We believe there is a better way to evaluate, invest in, and deploy
green energy technology. Our research examines the drivers of suc-
cessful innovation and illustrates how these drivers can yield a set
of predictable rules that govern the success of new technologies.
We also have developed a set of factors that predict the failure of
a new technology. Green energy technologies, just like those that
drive personal computers, mobile phones, and software, must fol-
low the rules of innovation and avoid its pitfalls.
For our purposes, green energy technologies are those that
either harness power from renewable, sustainable sources or
Spring 2011 • STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW 31
32 STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW • Spring 2011
seek to reduce adverse human impact on the environment. Many
of these technologies also hold the potential to contribute to en-
ergy independence. We include such technologies as solar, wind,
and geothermal power, biofuels, and smart power grids, as well as
hydrogen and electric vehicle propulsion. In order for these new
sources of energy to have the widest possible implementation, in-
vestors, technologists, and policymakers must understand not just
their potential impact but also their commercial viability. Many
technologies can be successful if they are deployed according to
sound innovation theory.
Why Advanced Technologies Often Fail
There are generally four reasons that advanced technologies fail to achieve commercial success: technical challenges, systemic complexity, head-on competition, and because
customers don’t want it.
Technical Challenges | The f irst reason is obvious: The technologi-
cal approach itself proves to be unworkable or unscalable. The plasmo-
dium parasites that cause malaria, for example, evolve so quickly they
have de f ied eradication by conventional immunological techniques.
And similarly, the potential for generating energy from controlled
nuclear fusion is still far away, because technological problems re-
peatedly defy techniques to initiate and control this reaction.
Most green energy technologies face some kind of signi f icant tech-
nological hurdle. Solar cell technology has undoubtedly advanced, but
it still faces technological hurdles to improving e f f iciency. Similarly,
battery technology, which is critical for electric vehicles, is coming
up against natural chemical boundaries. Fuel cells, elements of the
smart grid, and wind turbines all run into technological problems.
Systemic Complexity | A second reason promising technologies
fail is that they are rarely “plug compatible” with existing value
chains. Hydrogen-powered fuel cells promise a means of power-
ing vehicles with no emissions except a trickle of water out the tail
pipe. But fuel cells face an extremely long and challenging road to
commercial acceptance, as they su f fer from extraordinary systemic
complexity. The ubiquity of the gasoline f illing station is one reason
that fuel cells will have a di f f icult time achieving widespread adop-
tion. The infrastructure required to refuel a hydrogen-powered car
does not exist and would require the coordinated investment of
billions of dollars. Existing gasoline station equipment cannot be
adapted to store and dispense hydrogen. This entire stock of equip-
ment would need to be replaced. Hydrogen-powered cars can catch
on only if hydrogen f illing stations are liberally sprinkled across our
roadways. Unfortunately, such stations will not exist unless there are
a lot of hydrogen-powered cars as well. It is a classic technological
chicken-and-egg problem that can be overcome only through expen-
sive government mandates and subsidies that would alter the fuel
distribution infrastructure in a coordinated way. With such a large
and thriving gasoline ecosystem in place, we are more likely to see
adoption in technologies that either work with the existing system
or bypass it entirely. Gas-electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles are ex-
amples of technologies that improve fuel e f f iciency while working
within the constraints of the existing infrastructure.
The refueling station problem is a well-known barrier to hydrogen
adoption, but the systemic problems associated with hydrogen produc-
tion may be even more troubling. Hydrogen does not naturally exist
on the earth in the form required for fuel cells. Ironically, the most
common form of producing it is to separate hydrogen molecules from
natural gas, which produces harmful carbon emissions. The other op-
tion to produce pure hydrogen is through electrolysis, which breaks
down water into its constituent hydrogen and oxygen molecules. The
problem with this method is that even if large-scale electrolyzers were
technologically practical, such machines would require large quantities
of electricity. With renewable electricity generation still limited, the
only cost-e f fective way to power an electrolyzer would be from fossil
fuels, again defeating the purpose of hydrogen-powered vehicles.
Without su f f icient capacity of renewable electricity generation,
hydrogen-powered vehicles will not solve any environmental prob-
lems. For fuel cells to make sense, the entire system of electricity
generation must be substantially modi f ied. And perhaps even more
daunting: Should this feat be accomplished, every subsequent step in
the value chain would require a wholesale redesign of its existing
infrastructure. We are quite certain hydrogen fuel cells will f ind
limited success in displacing gasoline-powered engines.
Head-On Competition | The third cause of the commercial failure
of advanced technologies is head-on competition with established
technologies. When a technology is forced into direct competition
against an established foe, it will be adopted only if it is more cost-
and performance-e f fective than the established technology in the
markets where it is being used. This creates enormous barriers
against commercial success. New technologies have much better
success rates when they are aimed initially at nonconsumers—those
who are not consuming the existing products or services because
of lack of wealth, expertise, or access. These nonconsumers often
embrace products with limited functionality or quality, because they
are superior to the alternative: no product at all.
Consider the path that the transistor took in overthrowing the
vacuum tube. Throughout the early 1950s, most electronics prod-
ucts were made with vacuum tubes—devices the size of a child’s
f ist that consumed a lot of power. The mass of these devices meant
that the televisions and radios from which they were built had to be
large. Radios were placed on tabletops and televisions stood on the
f loor. All of the vacuum tube companies—the giants of consumer
electronics, such as RCA, Zenith, General Electric (GE), and West-
inghouse—saw the potential of the transistor and spent hundreds
of millions (in today’s dollars) trying to make the transistors good
enough for the markets where vacuum tubes were used.
Meanwhile, some inventors saw the potential for transistors to
create new markets altogether. The f irst commercial application for
Clayton M. Christensen is the Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of Business
Administration at Harvard Business School. He is best known for his book The In-
novator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book that Will Change the Way You Do Business,
a study of disruptive technologies and their impact on business.
Shuman Talukdar is a business development executive for Silicon Valley start-
ups and a graduate of Harvard Business School.
Richard Alton is a senior researcher at the Forum for Growth and Innovation
at Harvard Business School.
Michael B. Horn is the co-founder and executive director of education of In-
nosight Institute, as well as the co-author with Clayton Christensen of Disrupting
Class: How Disruptive Innovation Will Change the Way the World Learns.
Spring 2011 • STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW 33
transistors was the germanium transistor hearing aid in 1951—an ap-
plication where vacuum tubes weren’t feasible. Then in 1955 Sony in-
troduced its f irst pocket radio, a simple, inexpensive, low-performance
product. But Sony marketed its radio to teenagers, customers who
were delighted to have a limited product because it was better than
the alternative: no radio at all. While the vacuum tube companies
continued to work on the technology, Sony introduced the world’s f irst
portable transistor television in 1959. Again, it was a limited product.
But by making a TV so much more a f fordable, a new population of
customers whose apartments or wallets were not big enough to af-
ford an RCA television now could have one. Again, because the simple
Sony product was better than nothing, customers were delighted.
New markets emerged as Sony wielded simplicity and a f fordability
to compete against nonconsumption. By the late 1960s, solid-state
technology had become good enough that Sony and Panasonic
could begin building large televisions and radios. Within about
f ive years, customers had switched over to solid-state electronics,
and every one of the vacuum tube businesses vaporized.
Solar and wind power generation are green technologies that, at
least in the developed world, are being deployed in competition with
the existing electrical grid. As noted, whenever new technologies com-
pete head-on with established systems, challenges loom due to the
cost and performance gaps between the new technology and the old.
Solar and wind power are no di f ferent. Both are more expensive than
the existing grid, and both have performance de f iciencies related to
weather conditions. Even with signi f icant government subsidies to
encourage adoption, the percentage of total electricity derived from
wind and solar in the United States remains tiny, illustrating the bar-
riers these technologies face to displacing the existing grid.
Customers Don’t Want It | The fourth reason promising tech-
nologies fail commercially is that, although they provide technically
sophisticated functionality, they do not help customers do a job
they need to have done. By job, we mean a fundamental problem a
customer needs to solve, including a speci f ic result or outcome. If a
technology helps users accomplish a job they are already trying to
do in a superior way, it is far more likely to succeed. If a technology
tries to solve a job with which a customer isn’t terribly concerned,
it is likely to face headwinds.
The rise of digital photography o f fers an illustration of how con-
sumers will change their behavior in response to new technology, but
not the fundamental job they are trying to do. When prints were the
only way to view photos, people had the best of intentions to arrange
photos in albums, but the vast majority of prints were viewed once,
then placed in a shoebox. Despite this tendency, most people would
ask for double prints so they could mail the best photos to a family
member, not knowing beforehand which prints would turn out well.
Once digital cameras were fully adopted, consumers changed their
behavior, but not the fundamental job they wanted to perform with
photos. Now, the killer app for photos is e-mail. Despite all the sys-
tems for online photo albums, the dominant consumer behavior is
to attach photos to an e-mail for sharing. The technologies for online
photo albums were always going to be challenged as they tried to
perform a job that most consumers weren’t trying to do. The chal-
lenge is not in changing consumer behavior, but in changing the job
that consumers are trying to accomplish.
Although we believe the smart grid will be an important incremen-
tal innovation, certain aspects of it run afoul of the jobs-to-be-done
concept. The term “smart grid” encompasses a set of technologies
that allow both electricity producers and consumers to make better
decisions about power use through real-time data. Portions of the
smart grid system are necessary, evolutionary improvements to the
existing power grid. For example, advanced smart meters bene f it
power companies by eliminating the need for manual meter reading,
automating the billing process, and providing real-time detection of
outages.3 We believe smart grid technologies that lower cost or im-
prove performance will be readily adopted by power companies.
But smart grid enthusiasts may be disappointed as they f ind that
the behavioral change from consumers is not as strong as they had
anticipated. A subset of smart grid technologies are intended to pro-
vide electricity users with price signals to help people manage their
power consumption more e f f iciently. These technologies envision a
home in which a consumer, seeing the high cost of electricity from
2 p.m. to 4 p.m. in the summer, will turn down his air conditioning,
turn o f f lights, and lower the temperature in the fridge. The poten-
tial savings from this technology could be substantial—as much as
30 percent of a typical consumer’s power bill.
Although smart grid technology makes it possible for consumers to
achieve such savings, it does not ensure that consumers will change
their behavior. Just as we saw in the photography example, consum-
ers will change their behavior only if the technology helps them ac-
complish a job they were already trying to do. For frugal consumers
who already monitor their power consumption to reduce their power
bills, real-time price signals will be welcomed as a way to manage
their bill more e f f iciently. Unfortunately, not all consumers fall into
this category. Those who are not looking for a system to help manage
electricity usage will probably have little interest in smart grid tech-
nologies. They will not change their behavior, because the technology
does not help them do a job they already were trying to do.
Are green energy technologies doomed to failure for the reasons
we’ve outlined? We don’t think so. What follows are recommendations
Rating Green Technologies for
Successful Implementation
Low techni-
cal hurdles
Compatible
with existing
systems
Can win
head-on com-
petition with
incumbent
technologies
Fills
customer
“job-to-
be-done”
Geothermal ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Plug-in hybrid vehicles ✔ ✔ ✔
Solar ✔ ✔
Wind ✔ ✔
Biofuels ✔ ✔
Smart grid ✔ ✔
Fuel cells ✔
Electric vehicles ✔
Some of the most widely discussed green technologies face multiple barriers to commercialization.
Technologies that avoid most of these barriers, such as geothermal power and plug-in hybrid vehicles,
already have been or will be adopted commercially.
34 STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW • Spring 2011
on how to develop and deploy green energy technology to maximize
its chances for success in the developing and the developed world.
Green Energy in the Developing World
Solar energy is both less reliable and more expensive than tra-ditional power generation, despite its desirable environmental impact. Given its limitations, would-be commercializers of
solar energy should ask themselves: Where are there customers who
would value a technology that generates unreliable electricity? The
answer: the rural villages of India, Mongolia, Indonesia, Tanzania, and
other developing nations. These are the locations where solar energy
can be successfully commercialized, because solar will be competing
against nonconsumption of energy rather than a reliable, inexpensive
power grid. Just as Sony’s transistor radio gained acceptance among
nonconsumers, green technologies will f ind enthusiastic reception
in the unconnected villages of the developing world.
Commercializing green technology in the developing world has
the added bene f it of contributing to the f ight against carbon emis-
sions. Currently, nearly half of carbon dioxide emissions are from
developing nations. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, by
2030 developing nations will produce nearly double the carbon diox-
ide emissions of developed countries if their energy sources develop
along the same lines. So green technology can enable both greater
energy consumption and a cleaner path to economic development.
Although competition with nonconsumption will greatly aid its
commercial success, green technology faces unique challenges in
the developing world. First, technologies succeed best when the
business unit responsible for developing and deploying the technol-
ogy is also located where its targeted customers are. That way, the
business unit will have the cost structure and managerial incentives
that make pursuing “good enough” products at lower price points
an attractive proposition.4 For example, when the management of
GE’s medical imaging business was largely located in the developed
world, it focused on producing the most advanced and highest mar-
gin CT and MRI scanners possible. Once GE created an autonomous
business unit in China, it was able to develop a low-cost ultrasound
machine that had great bene f its in rural China. Furthermore, as GE
continued to develop these products, it began to f ind applications
for them in the developed world, opening up large markets for its
innovative products.
The second requirement for succeeding in the developing world
is to sell a product that provides a full solution for a customer need.
In the developing world, it may not be enough to sell solar panels.
Such a product may be of little use to a village with no electrical
infrastructure or appliances. Rather, it is important for companies
to deploy a technology that is tied to an application. D.light design,
which is based in India but was founded in Silicon Valley, illustrates
the importance of understanding customers’ circumstances. Rather
than just o f fer a lamp in a place with unreliable energy or o f fer a raw
solar cell, D.light bundles its lamps with solar panels f it for consumers’
energy requirements, which are small—often around 0.5 watts. Their
products are far better than commonly used kerosene alternatives,
because they are signi f icantly safer, are more durable, and provide
far better light. D.light design has distributed 1.7 million lamps to
rural Africa and India; it continues to develop its business.
The third requirement for the developing world is that companies
may need to integrate their activities across a wider spectrum of the
value chain. In many of these countries, a well-functioning sales and
distribution infrastructure with wholesalers and retailers does not
exist. As a result, companies that usually rely on partners to sell and
distribute their product may f ind a similar strategy impossible in
the developing world. In these regions, companies may need to take
on sales and aftermarket servicing to develop their markets. One
successful approach is the creation of a network of rural entrepre-
neurs who sell a company’s products to friends and family. D.light
design has developed such a system to increase its reach.
Green Energy in the Developed World
Green energy adoption faces more daunting challenges in the developed world. With a convenient, low-cost, and pervasive energy infrastructure in place, green technolo-
gies must prove themselves more a f fordable or better performing to
displace their competitors. By and large, the only way green energy
has been able to meet that standard is through government subsidies
that bridge the gap between actual cost and grid parity. Although a
small segment of consumers actively seek renewable energy sources
out of concern for the environment, the battle to win the hearts and
minds of hundreds of millions of developed world consumers will
not be won quickly enough to solve our energy and environmental
problems. We believe that there are some spaces in which green en-
ergy technologies can succeed and thrive in the developed world,
but they must comply with the rules of innovation.
One of the green technologies that can f ind a market is the electric
vehicle (EV). The EV contains certain limitations that will prevent it
from winning in head-on competition with traditional vehicles. Re-
member, to win in head-on competition, a technology must be either
less expensive or better performing, and the electric vehicle is nei-
ther. Despite undeniable progress, no manufacturer has succeeded in
bringing the cost of EVs below that of traditional sedans. And even
if EVs reach cost parity with gas vehicles, their performance limi-
tations remain. Battery technology caps an EV’s range at 100 miles
between recharges. Because a full recharge takes eight to 12 hours,
EVs cannot be used for long trips, which make up an important part
of the job-to-be-done for which consumers buy a car.5 Furthermore,
most EVs accelerate slowly and have maximum speeds well below
the 80 mph that consumers typically demand.
We believe there is a set of customers who would actively seek
out a car with both limited range and acceleration. The parents of
American teenagers have precisely the job-to-be-done for which an
electric vehicle would be a perfect match. These parents want to
allow their teenagers to transport themselves to and from school,
work, and friends’ homes, but nowhere else. They would actually
prefer a car that does not accelerate quickly or drive on freeways. To
complete their appeal to this market segment, EVs need to be priced
cheaply so that a f f luent families could plunk down cash to buy one.
Again, this is good news for EV manufacturers, as they can o f fer a
bare-bones version of their vehicles and not worry about their per-
formance relative to standard sedans. Compounding the good news
Spring 2011 • STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW 35
for manufacturers is the fact that by getting a product on the market,
they will incrementally improve their EVs, slowly closing the perfor-
mance gap with gas-powered vehicles. In this way, a low-priced EV
could disrupt the predominance of the gas-powered vehicle, just as
Sony’s transistor radios disrupted vacuum tube radios.
Although a real market for low-cost electric vehicles exists, it is
unlikely that EVs will achieve substantial market share for some time.
Disruption often unfolds at a glacial pace, especially in an industry
like autos with high capital costs and long design-to-production
cycles. For that reason, the primary mode of competition in the
auto industry will continue to be a sustaining one. By sustaining
competition, we mean that competitors will continue to try to best
each other within the framework of well-established technologies,
incrementally improving performance or reducing costs.
In industries where sustaining competition dominates, hybrid
technologies are likely to be adopted. This is because hybrid tech-
nology enables exactly those incremental performance or cost ad-
vantages that allow companies to win a head-on competition while
remaining within existing systems of use. In the automotive industry,
we have already seen hybrid vehicles, such as Toyota’s Prius, make
signi f icant inroads as fuel e f f iciency becomes an increasingly im-
portant basis of sustaining competition. Such vehicles do not su f fer
from any of the problems of systemic complexity that hydrogen- or
battery-powered vehicles face. They operate wholly within the exist-
ing automotive infrastructure, not requiring the infrastructure to
bend to its needs. Hybrid vehicles also may compete very e f fectively
in a head-on manner by being more convenient, if not eventually
lower cost. Although current hybrid technology cannot yet win in
head-on competition with gasoline vehicles, hybrids are far more
likely to be adopted in head-on competition than are pure-play
electric vehicles. We are particularly optimistic about the coming
generation of plug-in hybrids, which will propel cars up to 40 miles
on electricity before requiring the gasoline engine to kick in. This
solution provides the vast majority of everyday driving needs on
electricity alone, while preserving the f lexibility to take longer trips.
Early models will not be cost competitive, but as the technology im-
proves and scale advantages arise, cost competitiveness may well
be achieved, especially if gasoline prices continue to rise.
Conservation in the Developed World
So long as green technologies follow the rules of successful innovation, they will be adopted readily in the developed world. The problem is that the developed world’s existing
energy infrastructure is so cheap and convenient that it creates
large barriers to adopting new energy technologies. And with few
nonconsumers of energy, they o f fer hardly any space in which green
technologies can take hold organically. This is why governments in
developed countries must play a large role in formulating and en-
forcing conservation mechanisms to reduce energy use.
The recent move by some governments to phase out the incandes-
cent lightbulb is a good example of the kind of conservation measures
that are required. The incandescent lightbulb traces its history back
to Thomas Edison. These bulbs produce light by heating a f ilament
until it glows inside a glass bulb. Although the technology has served
the developed world well for more than a century, it is terribly inef-
f icient in its use of energy. Up to 90 percent of all the energy used in
a lightbulb is wasted as heat, with the bulb producing only 15 lumens
per watt. By contrast, a compact f luorescent lightbulb (CFL) produces
50 to 100 lumens per watt, and the energy savings more than make
up for a CFL’s increased cost ($3 per bulb vs. 50 cents per bulb for
incandescents). If a consumer were to spend $90 on 30 CFLs for her
house, total energy savings could range from $440 to $1,500 for the
f ive-year life of the bulbs.6 The United States has now mandated that
the incandescent lightbulb be phased out of the U.S. market in 2012.
Experts have estimated that if everyone in the country switches to
CFLs, it will eliminate the need for 30 coal- f ired power plants, and
will save an amount of electricity equivalent to that used by all the
homes in Texas each year.7
Government-mandated conservation e f forts succeed best when
they align with the interests of entrenched stakeholders. In the case
of the lightbulb, manufacturers f ind the mandate attractive as CFLs
represent a higher priced, higher pro f it margin product than incan-
descent bulbs. Consumers also stand to bene f it from the energy sav-
ings reaped from CFLs. By contrast, California’s attempt to establish
quotas for electric vehicles in the early 1990s was challenged from the
beginning. As the quotas applied only to California and EV technol-
ogy was so expensive at the time, it would have been very di f f icult for
automakers to earn a pro f it on vehicles produced in such low quan-
tities. This ran counter to their natural interest to produce higher
volume, higher margin vehicles. The resulting industry opposition
eventually caused California to retreat from its proposal. We don’t
argue that government should cater to powerful interests, only that
it should be prepared for a much more di f f icult path if conservation
mandates create large burdens for industry.
It is undeniable that the world needs cleaner and more sustain-
able sources of energy, and green energy technologies can contrib-
ute to that e f fort. Yet our research into innovation and technology
commercialization cautions us that the development and success
of these technologies must conform to well-established rules. It
would be a mistake for governments to pour large sums of money
into technologies that will have di f f iculty f inding commercial ac-
ceptance. But that is precisely the path many governments appear
to be following. A better way to develop and deploy green energy
technologies is to incubate them in places where they can succeed
commercially from the outset. n
Note s
Ernst & Young, “Venture Capital 2009 Investments in Cleantech Fall 50% to $2.6B as 1
Investors Shift Focus to Energy E f f iciency,” Feb. 8, 2010.
Keith Bradsher, “Solar Panel Maker Moves Work to China,” 2 The New York Times, Jan.
14, 2011.
Michael McNamara, et al., “Clean Technology Primer,” Je f feries & Company Re-3
search, Sept. 2009.
These institutional dynamics are more fully documented by Je f frey Immelt et al., 4
“How GE Is Disrupting Itself,” Harvard Business Review, October 2009.
Shai Agassi’s EV service provider company, Better Place, attempts to solve this prob-5
lem through its network of battery switching stations, but this e f fort su f fers from
signi f icant upfront capital costs.
Marianne Lavelle, “FAQ: The End of the Light Bulb as We Know It,” 6 U.S. News &
World Report, Dec. 19, 2007.
Steve Hargreaves, “The Fluorescent Light Bulb Boogeyman,” CNNMoney.com, Sept. 7
3, 2009.